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INTRODUCTION
If a physician told you that it was impossible to determine
the sex of your child because the child’s genitalia had
characteristics of a penis and a vagina, what would you do?
Would you authorize the doctor to surgically construct a vagina
or a phallus so that your child’s ambiguous genitalia could be
“normal”?
Many parents have no idea how to react or even accept the
realization that their child is intersex—a naturally occurring
biological phenomenon where a child is born with sex
characteristics that do not conform to the traditional male or
female definitions.1 Although intersex individuals occupy a
marginalized status, they have recently received more public
attention and have benefited from inclusion in the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) movement.2 Even though
1. See
Intersex
Definition,
COLLINS
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
http://
www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/intersex (last visited Mar. 24, 2014)
(defining intersex as “the condition of having characteristics intermediate between
those of a male and a female”); see also What Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM.,
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (defining
intersex as a person “born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to
fit the typical definitions of female or male”). The term “Disorder of Sexual
Development” (“DSD”) also describes the conditions of genital ambiguity and has
been used increasingly in medical and academic literature for scientific and ethical
reasons. This Note, however, exclusively uses the term “intersex” to describe this
phenomenon.
2. See Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex Initiative, GLOBAL RIGHTS,
http://www.globalrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=wwd_initiatives_lgbti
(last
visited Mar. 14, 2014) (describing the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex
(“LGBTI”) initiative launched in 2006 by human rights activists). While this Note uses
the acronym “LGBT,” other acronyms can also be used to describe sexuality and
gender identity-based communities such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer (“LGBTQ”). See Vicki L. Henry, Have No LGBTQ Clients? Think Again: What Every
Attorney Representing Youth Needs to Know, BOS. B.J., Summer 2013, at 10 (using the
acronym LGBTQ to describe a community of individuals who identify with genders and
sexualities outside of societal norms). For a discussion on the progress of the intersex
patient advocacy movement, see SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE
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members of the intersex community can face different forms of
discrimination than the LGBT community, they endure
hardships similar to those experienced by LGBT persons, which
allows for common advocacy goals.3 Intersex and transgender
individuals can face common issues concerning their gender
and sex, but the terms “intersex” and “transgender” are not
interchangeable.4 While the term “intersex” refers to a
biological phenomenon, “transgender” encompasses a spectrum
of individuals’ self-identifications and gender expressions that
do not match one’s assigned sex.5 The word “intersex” is also
used in place of the antiquated term, “hermaphrodite,” which
was commonly used to describe persons having reproductive
organs of both the male and female sex up until the end of the
twentieth century.6

CONTESTED SELF, 151 (2005) (describing the efforts of the Intersex Society of North
America to influence the medical community in the early 2000s and the inclusion of
prominent intersex speakers at notable medical conventions); see also Morgan Holmes,
Deciding Fate or Protecting a Developing Autonomy? Intersex Children and the Colombian
Constitutional Court, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 102, 103–05 (Paisley Currah et al. eds.,
2006) (chronicling the status of intersex advocacy from its humble beginnings in the
1990s to its rise in the public conscience in today’s social, academic, and medical
environments).
3. See generally JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CNT. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. &
NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011) (examining issues facing
transgender individuals in the United States including those who identify as intersex);
see also SILVAN AGIUS & CHRISTA TOBLER, EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRANS AND INTERSEX
PEOPLE: DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF SEX, GENDER IDENTITY AND GENDER
EXPRESSION (2012) (discussing EU law and its similar effect on transgender and
intersex individuals).
4. See GLAAD Media Reference Guide Transgender Glossary of Terms, GAY AND LESBIAN
ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last
visited Nov. 11, 2013) (designating the term transgender as an “umbrella term for
people whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from the sex they were
assigned at birth” while intersex describes “a person whose biological sex is
ambiguous”).
5. See id.; see also What’s the Difference Between Being Transgender or Transsexual and
Having an Intersex Condition?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/
transgender (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (explaining that transgender individuals are
born with typical female or male genitalia and experience an internal conflict between
their gender identity and their biological sex while intersex individuals have physical sex
characteristics that are ambiguous).
GREEN,
INVESTIGATION
INTO
DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST
6. JAMISON
TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE 63–64 (1994) (noting that “intersex” is a more appropriate
term for persons with ambiguous or underdeveloped sex organs than the politically
incorrect term “hermaphrodite”).
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Historically, society has functioned upon the premise that
there are two unambiguous sexes—male and female.7 Further,
when children are born with ambiguous genitalia, the medical
community has responded by surgically altering the intersex
infant to fit into either the male or female sex category.8 Socalled genital-normalizing surgery, however, does not aim to
disambiguate a child’s sex for reasons of medical necessity, but
rather to allay parental concerns and preserve social norms by
“fixing” genitalia that society has deemed “unacceptable.”9
In the District of South Carolina, the complaint in M.C. v.
Aaronson (“the Crawford case” or “Crawford”) recently
introduced to the United States the legal, ethical, and medical
issues regarding genital-normalizing surgery.10 Non-US tribunals,
on the other hand, have already deemed this practice to be
unconstitutional and violative of fundamental rights.11 In fact,
several countries have adopted methods outside the court
system that promote intersex autonomy and exhibit changing
social attitudes toward gender norms.12 These methods include a
third gender category on government-issued documents such as
birth certificates and passports, which directly challenges the
custom of the male-female sex dichotomy that is the driving

7. See Julie A. Greenberg, The Roads Less Traveled: The Problem with Binary Sex
Categories, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 51 (concluding that the law never
recognized the need to define male or female until intersex issues became relevant
during the turn of the twenty-first century); MORGAN HOLMES, INTERSEX: A PERILOUS
DIFFERENCE 57–58 (2008) (discussing intersex issues within the sole context of male
and female due to the social convention of acknowledging only two unequivocal sexes).
8. See Greenberg, supra note 7, at 53 (explaining the practice of “fixing” infants’
ambiguous genitalia to conform to medically established norms); see also Anne TamarMattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 21
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 60 (2006) (mentioning genital-normalizing
procedures which aim to allow intersex individuals to live “‘normal’” lives).
9. See infra Part I.D (noting that the medical community sees ambiguous genitalia
as a social emergency requiring immediate treatment rather than a diagnosis which
needs medical attention).
10. Complaint para. 46, M.C. v. Aaronson et al., (D.S.C. filed May 14, 2013) (No.
2:13-cv-01303), 2013 WL 1961775 [hereinafter Crawford Complaint]. As of March 2014,
this case is currently being litigated at the pre-trial level in federal court.
11. See infra Part II.A–B (introducing the non-US decisions that concluded
genital-normalizing surgery can deprive individuals of fundamental freedoms).
12. See infra Part II.D (exploring the unique administrative approaches several
nations have implemented to break away from traditional gender norms).
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force behind genital-normalizing surgery.13 These evolving
attitudes on sex and gender present legal theories that are
directly applicable to the Crawford case.14
This Note focuses on the practice of genital-normalizing
surgery on intersex infants and its consequent deprivation of
intersex individuals’ fundamental rights.15 Part I of this Note
discusses the definitions and categories of intersex conditions
and provides an overview of the history of sex assignment
surgery. Part II discusses four non-US cases regarding forced sex
assignment and examines the facts and claims of Crawford, the
first lawsuit in the United States that seeks to redress the
detrimental effects of genital-normalizing surgery and its
deprivation of fundamental rights. Finally, Part III applies this
non-US jurisprudence to Crawford to argue that genitalnormalizing surgery violates an individual’s constitutional right
to liberty.
I. IS IT A BOY OR A GIRL?: AN OVERVIEW OF
INTERSEXUALITY
Intersexuality is an extraordinary aspect of nature that
presents medical, ethical, social, and legal considerations. This
Part describes the biological characteristics and medical
community’s reaction to intersexuality and introduces the first
plaintiff in the United States to sue on issues relating to their
intersex status. Part I.A provides a scientific background on
intersexuality and its varying conditions. Part I.B then discusses
the medical profession’s routine response to intersex infants
and how physicians alter children’s ambiguous genitalia. Part I.C
introduces Dr. John W. Money’s “John/Joan” case study and
how it significantly influenced the medical profession in
adopting genital-normalizing surgery to treat intersex infants.

13. See infra Part II.D (commenting on countries that have adopted a third gender
option for government identity documents).
14. See infra Part III (arguing that the non-US cases and unique approaches
previously examined provide legal principles on genital-normalizing surgery that can
influence the Crawford case).
15. This Note uses the term “genital-normalizing surgery” and “sex assignment
surgery” to refer to any procedure performed by a surgeon on an intersex individual or
person with ambiguous genitalia for the purpose of making their genitals adhere to the
traditional appearance of male or female anatomy.
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Part I.D examines the policies of the American Academy of
Pediatrics on disambiguating intersex infants’ genitalia. Finally,
Part I.E tells the story of Max Beck, who suffered tragedies in
adolescence and adulthood because of genital-normalizing
surgery.
A. Defining Intersex
Intersex individuals have variations in sex characteristics,
such as ambiguous external genitalia, ambiguous internal
reproductive organs, or uncommon chromosomal patterns.16
Examples of ambiguous external genitalia include “micropenis”
(an unusually small penis), “cliteromegaly” (a significantly large
clitoris), and “scrotalized labia” (a condition where external
genitalia resemble labia and a scrotum).17 A chromosomal
abnormality is any combination of chromosomes in an
individual that is not XX, which denotes a biological female, or
XY, which denotes a biological male.18 Examples of
chromosomal abnormalities include XXY, known as Klinefelter
syndrome, and X0, known as Turner syndrome.19

16. Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 63 (detailing the variations in anatomy of
intersex individuals); see also RICARDO GONZALEZ & BARBARA M. LUDWIKOWSKI,
HANDBOOK OF UROLOGICAL DISEASES IN CHILDREN 158 (2011) (providing a thorough
description of male and female genital anomalies, such as micropenis, penile agenesis,
hypospadias, and urogenital sinus).
17. Kishka-Kamari Ford, “First, Do No Harm”—The Fiction of Legal Parental Consent
to Genital Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 469, 470–71
(2001) (specifying the myriad intersex conditions). For a detailed, scientific discussion
on intersex medical conditions, see Julie Greenberg, Defining Male and Female:
Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 278–92
(1999) (providing a thorough background on the biological components of
intersexuality).
18. See Greenberg, supra note 17, at 278 (outlining human sex development from
conception to birth and the deviations from typical chromosomal patterns); see also
Dennis O’Neil, Sex Chromosome Abnormalities, anthro.palomar.edu/abnormal/
abnormal_5.htm (last visited Mar 24, 2014) (reviewing the most common chromosomal
anomalies observed in the human population).
19. See O’Neil, supra note 18. Men who have Klinefelter Syndrome inherit one or
more additional X chromosomes and possess the chromosomal patterns XXY or XXXY.
Id. Klinefelter Syndrome occurs in 1 of every 500–1000 male births and usually causes
men to be slightly taller than average, have little to no body hair, and possess more
feminine characteristics than men with a typical XY chromosomal pattern. Id. Turner
Syndrome affects approximately one in 2000–5000 females. Id. Because women with
Turner Syndrome have only one X chromosome, they usually develop a short stature,
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Approximately 1 in 1500 births result in an intersex infant
who has ambiguous genitalia requiring the attention of a
medical expert specializing in sex differentiation.20 Medical
research has shown it is possible that nearly two percent of all
live births result in deviations from the “ideal male or female.”21
Rather than accepting the notion that humans are not always
completely male or female, society has attempted to reinforce
strict sexual dimorphism by modifying those who threaten the
legitimacy of the male-female sex binary.22
B. History of Medical Responses to Intersex
The customary medical response to intersex newborns has
been to surgically alter the non-conforming genitalia to create a
more “normal” penis or vagina—even if this means ignoring the
infant’s biological sex, internal reproductive organs,
chromosomal pattern, or likelihood of developing a certain
gender identity.23 Traditionally, medical doctors have operated
on boys born with an “inadequate” penis with the purpose of
either making the genitalia appear “normal” as a male, or to
make the child female by removing their phallus and

exceptionally small breasts, broad shoulders, and a propensity for thyroid disease, heart
defects, and diabetes. Id.
20. Alice Domurat Dreger, “Ambiguous Sex”—or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues
in the Treatment of Intersexuality, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 1998, at 3, 26
(visiting the issue of frequency of intersex individuals); see also How Common Is Intersex?,
INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency (last visited Nov. 15,
2013) (estimating that one in 1500 to 2000 live births result in intersex children but
many more individuals have subtler atypical sex characteristics which can go unnoticed
until adolescence).
21. Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12
AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 161 (2000) (distinguishing the frequency of intersex
newborns as two percent of all live births from the frequency of newborns receiving
genital-normalizing surgery as 0.2% of all live births); see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at
63 (noting the approximate number of intersex births).
22. Blackless et al., supra note 21, 161 (reflecting on society’s strict adherence to
the assumption of two unambiguous sexes).
23. Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 64 (referring to this medical response as the
“concealment model” which encourages secrecy and denial of children’s intersex
conditions); see Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, para. 46 (suggesting that the
likelihood of developing a certain gender identity can be determined because the
plaintiff’s doctors noted “high testosterone levels” and significant prenatal
“testosterone imprinting” as factors that might indicate the plaintiff’s ultimate gender
identity).
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constructing a vagina.24 Newborn girls who possess a clitoris that
is deemed too large will undergo surgery to have their masculine
genitalia shortened so that it is the “appropriate” size.25
Unfortunately these surgical decisions rarely involve
considerations of the child’s potential for sexual performance as
an adult or their ability to have children.26
The concept of assigning sex and gender via surgery has
existed since the 1950s.27 In light of Dr. John W. Money’s
notorious “John/Joan” case study, doctors began routinely
performing genital-normalization procedures during the early
1970s to resolve the “problem” of genitalia that do not clearly
conform to the biological male or female sex.28
C. The “John/Joan” Case Study
In 1972, in his book Man & Woman, Boy & Girl, Dr. John
W. Money of Johns Hopkins University published a study with
the hypothesis that psychosexual development is not inherent to

24. Dreger, supra note 20, at 28 (detailing the practice of genital-normalizing
procedures); see also Ford, supra note 17, at 471 (noting that an “adequate” penis of a
newborn male measures at least 2.5 centimeters when stretched out); cf. Comm. on
Genetics, Evaluation of the Newborn with Developmental Anomalies of the External Genitalia,
106 PEDIATRICS 138, 139 (2000) (noting that medical attention is needed when a
newborn male’s outstretched penis measures less than 2.0 centimeters). The Intersex
Society of North America has created a “phall-o-meter” to serve as a visual
representation of the arbitrary standards that determine sex. See PREVES, supra note 2,
at 139, available at http://alicedreger.com/phallometer.html.
25. Dreger, supra note 20, at 28; Ford, supra note 17, at 471 (noting that a clitoris
is too large if it exceeds more than 1.0 centimeter at birth).
26. Comm. on Genetics, supra note 24, at 139 (noting that genital-normalizing
surgery is primarily concerned neither with adult orgasm potential nor fertility). But see
Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 118
PEDIATRICS 488, 490–91 (2006) (suggesting that fertility potential ought to play a role
in making sex determinations for some intersex conditions, but medical treatment
must assign a gender to all intersex individuals).
27. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma:
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2–3 (2000) (discussing the origins of genital-normalizing
surgery in the 1950s); see Dreger, supra note 20, at 27 (claiming that the notion of
gender assignment became tenable around the 1910s).
28. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 16 (observing that the publication of Dr.
Money’s “John/Joan” study in pediatric literature established the contemporary
medical model for treating intersexuality); see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 64 (noting
the normative underpinnings of Dr. Money’s theory found in the traditional and
current medical treatment of intersexuality).
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an individual but influenced by their surroundings.29 Essentially,
Dr. Money hypothesized that an infant with anomalous sex
characteristics could have his or her genitals surgically altered to
conform to a strict appearance of male or female.30 He believed
that this genital alteration, which is never revealed to the
intersex individual, allows the child to develop a gender identity
that matches the sex chosen by the surgeon.31
Dr. Money’s study did not involve an intersex child but
rather an infant named Bruce Reimer who was born biologically
as a male and suffered severe trauma to his penis due to
circumcision complications.32 In order to test his hypothesis, Dr.
Money experimented with this tragedy and constructed female
sex organs so Bruce could have normal-looking genitalia.33 Dr.
Money convinced Mr. and Mrs. Reimer that Bruce could actually
be raised as a girl with “normal” genitalia and therefore have a
“normal” life.34 Under Dr. Money’s theory, it was imperative
“that once the sex was decided on, doctors and parents never

29. JOHN MONEY & ANKE A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY & GIRL: THE
DIFFERENTIATION AND DIMORPHISM OF GENDER IDENTITY FROM CONCEPTION TO
MATURITY (1972); see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 60 (articulating Dr. Money’s theory
that children do not necessarily develop gender identities that match their biological
sex, but rather form gender identities that match the sex acknowledged by their family,
peers, and medical professionals throughout childhood); see also Dreger, supra note 20,
at 25 (asserting that this hypothesis also assumes that healthy psychosexual
development depends on the appearance of genitalia).
30. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17–18 (noting that this theory provided a
convenient solution to a precarious circumstance); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8,
at 64 (characterizing Dr. Money’s theory as a way to mask the natural conditions of
intersex children).
31. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17–18 (emphasizing that physicians do not
clarify whether genital-normalizing surgery aims to help intersex individuals accept
their childhood or be comfortable with their gender in adulthood); see also TamarMattis, supra note 8, at 64 (highlighting secrecy as one of the central means to the
desired gender identity under the “concealment model”).
32. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 6 (introducing the story behind the
“John/Joan” case); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 59–60 (reporting the causes of
Bruce’s ambiguous genitalia).
33. See John Colapinto, The True Story of John/Joan, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 11, 1997,
at 54, 55–56 (explaining that after previous medical professionals concluded that Bruce
could not have “normal heterosexual relations” as an adult due to his deformed penis,
Bruce’s parents sought out Dr. Money upon learning of his expertise in gender
transformation and psychology); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 59–60 (alleging
that Dr. Money’s research was incomplete and omitted the actual results of the study).
34. Colapinto, supra note 33, at 3 (recounting Dr. Money’s belief that children
were born psychosexually neutral and therefore able to adapt to assigned genders).
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waver in their decision, for fear of introducing dangerous
ambiguities into the child’s mind.”35 In 1967, Mr. and Mrs.
Reimer gave consent for genital-normalizing surgery on their
son, and in less than a week they took home their “normalized”
little girl, Brenda.36
As time passed, Dr. Money reported Brenda Reimer’s
outcome as an unequivocal success.37 This research led the
medical community to adopt the theory that children are born
psychosexually neutral and can adapt to the gender in which
they are raised regardless of their biological sex.38 This theory
serves as the rationale for genital-normalizing surgery on
intersex children.39 Dr. Money’s reports on the “John/Joan”
case, however, concealed the reality that the attempt to raise the
biological male “Bruce” as the surgically and socially
constructed female “Brenda” was, in fact, a complete failure.40
The truth is that Bruce Reimer never accepted the sex forced
upon him by his parents and physicians.41 He identified as a boy

35. Id. (noting that this concept assumed the younger the child was, the more
psychosexually neutral they were). Dr. Money recommended that sex reassignment be
completed as early as possible, preferably within the first thirty months of the child’s
life. See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 64 (discussing the hypothesis that an early sex
assignment strengthens the parent-child bond by providing the parents with a
“normal” child as soon as possible).
36. See Colapinto, supra note 33, at 3 (explaining that Bruce was renamed after his
surgery and raised as “Brenda” throughout his childhood); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra
note 8, at 60 (recalling the early stages of the “John/Joan” case).
37. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17 (describing the omission of signs of
Brenda’s rejection of female identity from the publishing of her story); See TamarMattis, supra note 8, at 60 n.7 (noting that this gender assignment surgery was reported
as an achievement in the medical community).
38. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17 (indicating the “John/Joan” case was
widely disseminated in medical literature after its 1972 publication); see also Dreger,
supra note 20, at 25 (commenting on the large scale reports of Dr. Money’s study).
39. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17–18 (noting the predominant standard of
care for genitalia that was ambiguous, deformed, and unable to fulfill sexual function
was to surgically create genitalia which could have normal adult sexual function).
Standard practice in genital-normalizing surgery favors female sex determinations over
male, unless there is good reason to make the child male. See Int’l Library of Ethics,
Law, and the New Med., ETHICS AND INTERSEX, 208, 212 (Sharon E. Sytsma ed., 2006)
(observing that the majority of intersex patients receive a female genitoplasty diagnosis
but the operation is generally unsuccessful).
40. Colapinto, supra note 33, at 1 (describing the actual results of the
“John/Joan” case study); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 61 (revealing that Dr.
Money had lied about the successful transformation of Bruce to Brenda).
41. Colapinto, supra note 33, at 4–5; see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 60–61.
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from early childhood, rejecting the idea that he was a girl.42
Bruce ripped off the dresses his mother gave him, he urinated
standing up, and he expressed virtually no feminine traits in his
mannerisms and social behavior.43
When Bruce was fourteen years old, his parents revealed
the truth to him about his botched circumcision and sex
reassignment.44 He immediately stopped wearing girls clothing
and ceased his estrogen management.45 By the time Bruce was
sixteen, he had his breasts removed, a phallus constructed to
replace his previous surgically fashioned vagina, and changed
his name from Brenda to David.46 Sadly, David Reimer
ultimately committed suicide in May 2004 at age 38, finally
succumbing to a lifelong struggle with depression.47
Dr. Money’s influence on the standard of care for intersex
individuals persisted for nearly three decades despite people
learning the true results of the “John/Joan” case in the early
1990s.48 As the intersex community became more visible in the
early 2000s, the medical community began to recognize the

42. See Colapinto, supra note 33, at 4–5 (demonstrating that the little girl, Brenda,
always wanted to be a boy); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 60–61 (quoting Bruce
Reimer as saying he was “just a boy with long hair and girl’s clothes” to his
psychologists during childhood).
43. See Colapinto, supra note 33. at 6–7 (recounting Bruce’s childhood behavior as
“Brenda” was boorish and he daydreamed of being a man with a mustache who owned
a sports car); see also Dreger, supra note 20, at 25
44. Colapinto, supra note 33at 7 (expressing that Bruce’s parents could no longer
keep their son’s secret from him in good conscience); see Dreger, supra note 20, at 25
(confirming that Bruce readopted his male status upon learning the truth at fourteen
years old).
45. Colapinto, supra note 33, at 8 (detailing Bruce’s reaction to learning that he
was born male); see Tamar-Mattis supra note 8, at 61 (noting that Bruce began living as
a boy immediately after he learned of his genital-normalizing surgery).
46. Colapinto, supra note 33 at 8 (laying out the steps Bruce took to reclaim his
male sex and gender); see Dreger, supra note 20, at 25 (observing that Bruce received
several surgeries during his teenage years to become a man).
47. John Colapinto, Gender Gap: What Were the Real Reasons Behind David Reimer’s
Suicide?, SLATE, June 3, 2004, 3:58 PM, http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_
science/medical_examiner/2004/06/gender_gap.html (commenting on David
Reimer’s psychological, financial, and marital problems); see Tamar-Mattis, supra note
8, at 61 (noting David’s choice to take his own life).
48. See supra Part I.C (discussing the lasting impact of the “John/Joan” case study
even though the medical community became aware that its findings were completely
distorted).
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intersex advocacy movement.49 The medical community in the
United States started developing an approach to treating
intersex individuals that shifted away from Dr. Money’s theory
by focusing on more aspects of the situation, including the
intersex individual.50
D. Current Practice of Genital-Normalizing Surgery
In 2000, the American Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”)
declared that a child with ambiguous genitalia is a “social
emergency” and such a diagnosis “require[s] urgent medical
attention.”51 The AAP directed medical professionals to inform
parents that the child’s “abnormal appearance can be corrected
and the child [could be] raised as a boy or a girl as
appropriate.”52 This protocol embodies the flawed concept that
immediate sex assignment is the optimal treatment for an
intersex newborn because it promotes the unnecessary need to
create genitalia that conform to the strict male-female binary
and over-emphasizes allaying societal pressures and parental
concerns.53
The AAP modified its approach to genital-normalizing
surgery on intersex infants in 2006.54 The new approach
acknowledges that “[t]he birth of an intersex child prompts a
long-term management strategy that involves myriad
49. See supra, note 2 and accompanying text (acknowledging the progress of the
intersex advocacy movement in the healthcare context at the start of the new
millennium).
50. Compare Lee, supra note 26, at 488 (focusing on the interests of the parents and
the intersex child as a single unit in conjunction with the advice of pediatric specialists),
with Comm. on Genetics, supra note 24, at 138 (focusing on social concerns and solely
on the needs of the intersex child’s parents).
51. Comm. on Genetics, supra note 24, at 138 (expressing the medical
community’s primary opinion on and approach to intersexuality).
52. Id. (stressing the importance of healthcare professionals being empathetic
with and attentive to the parents’ anxieties and needs).
53. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17 (recalling the psychosexual assumption
that immediately choosing a sex for the child, altering the child’s genitalia to match
that sex, and raising the child to identify with the gender of that sex, will result in a
psychologically and socially stable development for the child); see Tamar-Mattis, supra
note 8, at 71 (claiming that there is no scientific or medical study that shows physical or
psychological benefits from genital-normalizing surgery).
54. See Lee, supra note 26 at 488 (reporting that improvements in patient
management, surgical techniques, and diagnosis methods have affected the way
physicians treat intersex individuals).
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professionals working with the family.”55 The AAP’s new
consensus on treating children with intersex conditions suggests
that “normalizing” the child is not an urgent decision, but a
process that must consider psychological issues and recognize
patient autonomy.56 Further, it represents the medical
community’s retreat from the belief that a child’s psychosexual
development is determined by the child’s genitalia and gender
assigned by the child’s doctor and parents.57 Rather, the 2006
approach recognizes that factors such as androgen exposure,
brain structure, sex chromosomes, family dynamics, and social
experiences influence a child’s psychosexual development.58
Notwithstanding the advances reflected in this approach to
intersexuality and intersex autonomy, Dr. Money’s theory still
has clout in the medical community.59
The 2006 AAP Consensus uses language that may appease
intersex patient advocates by discussing the risk of “gender
dissatisfaction” in adulthood, the essential need for “open
communication with patients and family,” and the importance
of preserving “erectile function and the innervation of the
clitoris.”60 But, this language is unlikely to have more than a
nominal impact on genital-normalizing procedures as the
Consensus continues to direct doctors to rely on the 1996 AAP
guidelines encouraging early reconstruction of genitals.61 These

55. Compare id. at 488 (focusing on the interests of the parents and the intersex child
as a single unit in conjunction with the advice of pediatric specialists), with Comm. on
Genetics, supra note 24, at 138 (focusing on social concerns and solely on the needs of
the intersex child’s parents).
56. Lee, supra note 26, at 489–90 (using language that demonstrates a seemingly
cautious approach to the treatment of intersex infants).
57. Id. at 489 (providing a more comprehensive explanation and understanding
of intersex conditions).
58. Id. (defining “psychosexual development” as a concept composed of gender
identity, gender role, and sexual orientation); cf. Comm. on Genetics, supra note 24, at
138 (promoting the idea that the appearance of genitals and social upbringing are
determinative of gender identity).
59. See id. (emphasizing early genital-normalizing procedures on children with
ambiguous genitalia).
60. Id. at 489–91.
61. Id. at 492 (suggesting that genital surgery for cosmetic reasons is unnecessary
and ineffective at strengthening a parent’s bonds with his or her child, but nonetheless
advocating for guidelines that encourage early surgery on intersex infants); see also
Section on Urology, Timing of Elective Surgery on the Genitalia of Male Children with
Particular Reference to the Risks, Benefits, and Psychological Effects of Surgery and Anesthesia,
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1996 guidelines embrace the belief popularized by Dr. Money
that children are psychosexually neutral at birth and that
immediate treatment will create a “normal” life for the child.62
Because physicians perform one hundred to two hundred
genital-normalizing surgeries on infants each year, this
contradictory protocol is relied upon by US surgeons, on
average, two or more times every week.63
E. Intersex Voices
A significant portion of the intersex population is
dissatisfied with the genital-normalizing surgery they were
subjected to in early childhood and report psychological and
sexual problems throughout adulthood.64 One intersex
individual exhorts: “Wait for the babies to be able to say who
they are. They are destroying lives, that’s what they are doing.”65
97 PEDIATRICS 590, 139 (1996) (advocating for immediate treatment that mimics the
methods developed by Dr. Money’s “John/Joan” case study).
62. See Section on Urology, supra note 61, at 139 (stating that “children whose
genetic sexes are not clearly reflected in external genitalia (i.e., hermaphroditism) can
be raised successfully as members of either sex if the process begins before the age of 2
1/2 years”).
63. Ford, supra note 17, at 469 (providing the frequency of intersex treatment that
results in genital-normalizing procedures).
64. The 2012 Köhler study found that forty-seven percent of intersex individuals
were dissatisfied with their surgeries overall, and concluded that there should be a
decrease in genital-normalizing procedures and such surgery should be performed only
when the individual can give consent. See Birgit Köhler et al., Satisfaction with Genital
Surgery and Sexual Life of Adults with XY Disorders of Sex Development: Results from the
German Clinical Evaluation Study, J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM, Feb.
2012, at 10-11. The 2004 Meyer-Bahlburg study, though, stated that only thirty-two
percent of intersex adults are actually dissatisfied with their gender after having
undergone genital-normalizing procedures as a child. See H. F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg et
al., Attitudes of Adult 46, XY Intersex Persons to Clinical Management Policies, 171 J. Urology
1615 (2004). The conclusions of the 2004 Meyer-Bahlburg study, however, were refuted
by Morgan Holmes in her book Intersex: A Perilous Difference, discussed above. HOLMES,
supra note 7, at 57–59. Holmes questioned the validity of the 2004 Meyer-Bahlburg
study due to its inherent bias with weighting of questions, limited survey population,
and insufficient data to create a diversified analysis of the survey population. Id.
65. See McKenzie Martin, Living a Lie: Local Intersex Woman Shares Her Story, Nov.
13, 2009, http://www.kktv.com/home/headlines/69933377.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2013) (quoting Debbie Wuco, an intersex woman forced to live as a man due to genitalnormalizing surgery, as she speaks out against the practice of early sex assignment
surgery and the psychological wounds it imposes); Stephanie Stevens, Living A Lie: An
Intersex Woman Shares Her Story, YOUTUBE (Nov. 13, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=jbwR0inBd8s (broadcasting a local news segment featuring Debbie Wuco and
her intersex story).
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The destruction referred to is the mismatch between one’s
gender identity and one’s sex.66 Early sex assignment surgery for
intersex individuals also has been shown to create adult risks of
sexual anxiety, impotence, minimal clitoral arousal, and overall
dissatisfaction with one’s sex life.67
As an example, genital-normalizing surgery greatly affected
Max Beck, whose experience is not atypical.68 Max was born with
a rudimentary phallus and a scrotalized labia.69 Doctors made
the decision to remove Max’s phallus and make him into a
female, and they instructed his parents to raise him as a girl.70
Max became “Judy,” and as Max explained, Judy developed into
a “rough-and-tumble tomboy” experiencing adolescence “with
no physical sense of self” and as “a sort of sexual Frankenstein’s
monster.”71 The doctors who managed Judy’s hormone
treatment often told Max that he was an “unfinished” girl, and
they performed a final vaginoplasty on Max during his teenage
years.72

66. See Colapinto, supra note 33, at 8 (detailing the angst experienced by David
Reimer from being forced to live as an anatomical girl from infancy while identifying
with the male gender since childhood); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 68–69
(highlighting the trauma faced by intersex individuals who unknowingly undergo a
genital-normalizing procedure and develop a gender identity that does not match their
sex).
67. See Köhler, supra note 64 (observing markedly high rates of sexual problems in
intersex individuals with desire, arousal, and painful intercourse); cf. Dreger, supra note
20, at 29 (summarizing a study that suggests males with micropenis do not need to
undergo genital-normalizing procedures to enjoy sexual function as an adult).
68. See Max Beck, My Life as an Intersexual, Oct. 30, 2001, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/nova/body/intersexual-life.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (telling the story of
an intersex individual made to live as a woman because of genital-normalizing surgery
but who identified as a man in adulthood); see also Understanding the Gender Binary: How
Does the Two-Gender System Impact You?, Challenge Sex Binary, GENEDERBINARY, http://
genderbinary.wikidot.com/challenge-sex-binary (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) [hereinafter
Challenge Sex Binary] (sharing Max Beck’s trauma and triumphs as an intersexual).
69. Beck, supra note 68 (revealing Max’s psychological, physical, and emotional
damage caused by his genital-normalizing surgery performed during infancy); see
Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (noting Max’s intersex condition).
70. Beck, supra note 68 (reviewing Max’s medical history); see Challenge Sex Binary,
supra note 68 (discussing parental involvement in the sex assignment process).
71. Beck, supra note 68 (providing an idea of how genital-normalizing procedures
affect intersexual individuals); see Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (quoting Max Beck
as he revisits his adolescence).
72. Beck, supra note 68 (describing the medical treatment intersexual children
must receive in order to maintain their assigned sex); see Challenge Sex Binary, supra
note 68 (remembering Max’s teenage years).
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In adulthood, Max identified as a lesbian because he had
no reason to believe he was not a woman.73 Although Max felt
empowered through identification with the lesbian community,
his self-loathing continued, stemming from the realization that
he could never be intimate with women because they would
notice his disfigured genitalia.74 Max attempted suicide at the
age of twenty-one and endured years of depression due to the
disconnect between his psychological and corporal self.75
Max discovered what had happened to him as an infant
when his therapist obtained medical records revealing his
intersex condition at birth.76 Max described himself as feeling
like a “freak” and a “monster” as this revelation stripped him of
his lesbian identity.77 Over time, Max became involved with the
intersex community and decided to transition from female to
male.78 He married Tamara Alexander in 2000, and identified as
an intersexual male until his passing in 2008 from cancer.79

73. Beck, supra note 68 (illustrating the identity problems created by genitalnormalizing surgery); see Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (showing how keeping an
intersex condition a secret from an individual can cause confusion and torment in
regards to gender identity and sexuality).
74. Beck, supra note 68 (detailing the physical and emotional harms associated
with mismatching an individual’s sex and gender identity); see Challenge Sex Binary,
supra note 68 (noting Max’s development of a sexual identity).
75. Beck, supra note 68 (exposing the depth of Max’s personal struggle with his
sexual and psychological identity); see Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68
(acknowledging the dark side of genital-normalizing surgery on intersexuals).
76. Beck, supra note 68 (explaining how Max came to learn of his true identity);
see Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (reiterating that sex assignment surgeries are kept
secret from intersex children even into adulthood).
77. Beck, supra note 68 (noting the continued trauma Max experienced); see
Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (noting Max’s intersex condition).
78. Beck, supra note 68 (discussing Max’s personal decision to identify as an
intersex individual and transition into the sex he felt most comfortable with); see
Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (reflecting a common intersex narrative where the
individual transitions into their true gender in adulthood).
79. Beck, supra note 68 (discussing Max’s adult life after coming into his identity
as an intersexual); see Alice Dreger, Bye, Max. (We Already Miss You.), Feb. 4, 2008,
http://alicedreger.com/Max.html (reminiscing Max’s life and discussing his lost battle
with cancer). To read Max’s personal blog documenting his final months fighting
cancer, see Max Beck, I am a Cancer Survivor, http://home.mindspring.com/~maxyxo/
index.html (reflecting back on his accomplishments, family, and goals, and detailing
the struggles of receiving cancer treatment).
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Although intersexuality is rare and not a new phenomenon,
it still presents important social, medical, and legal issues.80 The
theories that characterized the traditional approach to treating
infants with ambiguous genitalia remain the primary reasons for
the current practice of genital-normalizing surgery.81 Many
individuals have undergone early sex assignment surgery, and
the Crawford case in South Carolina addresses the present
concerns created by altering children’s genitalia, such as
medical ethics, individual autonomy, and reproductive rights.82
II. INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE & THE UNITED
STATES’ COMMENCING CASE ON INTERSEX ISSUES
There are only a handful of legal decisions in the world that
involve sex assignment surgery and intersex issues.83 Part II.A
summarizes the 1995 and 1999 Colombian court decisions,
which established the unprecedented protection of intersex
minors from parental consent to genital-normalizing surgeries.
Part II.B then examines Germany’s 2007 Völling decision, which
parallels the holdings of the Colombian cases. Part II.C
introduces the facts and legal claims of the groundbreaking
intersex lawsuit in the United States, the Crawford case. Lastly,
Part II.D concludes by discussing several alternative public policy
options administered by various nations that promote the rights
of intersex individuals.
A. The Constitutional Court of Colombia
Throughout the 1990s, Colombia issued landmark rulings
in cases regarding sex assignment surgery and intersex
80. See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text (discussing the AAP’s conflicting
medical guidelines and the social and sexual problems faced by intersex individuals
who receive genital-normalizing surgery).
81. See supra, notes 58–62 and accompanying text (revealing that the flawed
theory that initially caused physicians to regularly perform genital-normalizing surgery
lingers in AAP guidelines).
82. See supra Part I.E (presenting intersex narratives).
83. See Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 41, 49
(2004) (noting that Colombia is the only country in the world to have addressed the
medical treatment of intersex infants through its judiciary); see also Julie A. Greenberg
& Cheryl Chase, Background of Colombia Decisions, Intersex SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://
www.isna.org/node/21 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (discussing the consequences of the
unique 1995 and 1999 Colombian decisions).
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children.84 The first of these cases, The Decision of Y.Y., had
broad implications for intersex autonomy and protected all
individuals from any genital-normalizing procedure.85 Four years
later, The Decision of X.X. narrowed this broad protection to only
apply to intersex minors capable of making medical decisions
for themselves.86 In the same year the Constitutional Court of
Colombia, in The Decision of N.N., clarified what information
doctors must disclose to parents to ensure they are able to give
informed consent to genital-normalizing surgery on their
intersex children, who, due to their young age, cannot make
competent medical decisions.87
1. The Decision of Y.Y.
In 1995, the Constitutional Court of Colombia became the
first tribunal to issue a decision on the rights of an intersex

84. See Haas, supra note 83, at 43 (contrasting the fact that the United States has
not seen a case involving genital-normalizing surgery with Colombia, which has decided
multiple cases regarding intersex issues and sex assignment procedures); see also
Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 (recognizing the historical significance of
Colombia’s rulings).
85. See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], octubre 23,
1995, Sentencia T-477/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.)
(holding that only the individual can consent to a surgery that determines his or her
gender regardless of the individual’s age); see also Haas, supra note 83, (articulating the
Court’s ruling in The Decision of Y.Y., which requires the patient’s own informed
consent for genital-normalizing procedures).
86. See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia SU337/99, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.) (holding that parents
cannot consent to sex assignment surgery on an intersex child who can make
competent medical decisions but can under certain circumstances give consent for
intersex children too young to consent to medical procedures); see also Greenberg &
Chase, supra note 83 (interpreting The Decision of X.X. to allow parental informed
consent to genital-normalizing surgery depending on the urgency of the surgery,
riskiness of the surgery, and the autonomy of the child).
87. See Haas, supra note 83, at 52 (explaining that The Decision of N.N. required a
heightened standard of parental informed consent); The Court, CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT OF COLOMBIA, http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/lacorte/(last visited Nov.
20, 2013) (explaining that the Constitutional Court of Colombia is the highest entity in
the nation’s judicial branch and serves to safeguard the integrity and supremacy of the
Colombian Constitution). See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional
Court], Sentencia T-551/99, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.)
(holding that parental informed consent must encompass a knowledge of intersex
conditions and alternative treatment options among other things).
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plaintiff.88 In The Decision of Y.Y., a teenage boy, whose name was
not identified, filed suit against the physicians who operated on
him as an infant.89 Like David Reimer in the “John/Joan” case, a
botched circumcision had left the plaintiff with a deformed
penis.90 His parents, therefore, had consented to “any treatment
that would improve their son’s situation including a sex
change.”91 On April 21, 1981, doctors had operated on the
plaintiff to “correct” his traumatized penis by changing his sex
and giving him “normal” female parts.92
The goal of the surgery had been to provide the child with
the opportunity to have sexual intercourse as an adult and
thereby live a “normal” life.93 Just like David Reimer, the
plaintiff never developed a female gender identity and
experienced significant emotional trauma from being forced to
live in a sexual identity chosen for him.94 He grew up constantly
questioning his sexual identity and felt anguished living as a
female.95 As a teenager, upon learning of the surgery performed
on him as a child, the plaintiff sued the hospital and the
physicians who performed the surgery.96

88. See Kate Haas, supra note 83, at 49 (2004) (framing the timeline of Colombia’s
decisions on genital-normalizing surgery); see also Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83
(discussing the significance of this landmark ruling).
89. See Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85
(withholding the name of the plaintiff in order to protect his identity); see also
Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 (identifying the plaintiff without disclosing his
name).
90. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 1.2
(reviewing the physical history of the plaintiff’s genitalia); see also Haas, supra note 83,
at 49 (noting the plaintiff was accidentally castrated during circumcision).
91. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 1.2
(translated by author) (demonstrating the parents’ fears and desire to “correct” their
son’s genitalia at any cost).
92. Id. (translated by author) (summarizing the decision to make Y.Y. a female).
93. Id. (translated by author) (discussing the plaintiff’s genital-normalizing
surgery); Haas, supra note 83, at 94 (explaining the goals of the sex assignment
surgery).
94. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 5.1
(detailing the plaintiff’s psychological struggles exhibited by his alarming behavior
when others treated him as a female).
95. Id. at 5.1 (noting that the plaintiff often felt isolated, confused, and depressed
because of the mismatch between his gender identity and sex).
96. See id. at 2 (pointing out the plaintiff’s desire to be remedied for the harm
caused by the sex assignment surgery).
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The Constitutional Court of Colombia held that the doctors
violated Y.Y.’s constitutional rights by performing genitalnormalizing surgery.97 More specifically, the Court held the
physicians liable for violating the minor’s constitutional right to
identity.98 The decision described this right to identity as “part
of human dignity.”99 The Court also held that each individual
holds individual rights closely related to one’s autonomy.100 The
Court reasoned that autonomy allows for self-determination,
which in turn allows the individual to develop their identity
freely.101
Citing to Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the Court emphasized the State’s role in
protecting the identity of children.102 The Court focused on the
Convention’s principle that a State must “provid[e] appropriate
assistance” to children who have been illegally deprived of their

97. Id. at 8 (characterizing the procedure as a deprivation of the plaintiff’s
fundamental rights to identity and autonomy).
98. Id. (asserting the fundamental rights at stake are an individual’s right to
identity and dignity); see Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 (discussing the rights to
develop one’s own personality and to define one’s sexuality as aspects of one’s right to
identity).
99. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 15.1
(translated by author) (depicting a circular chain of fundamental rights by reasoning
that human dignity encompasses the right to identity).
100. Id. (articulating that the right to identity bestows rights affecting one’s
autonomy, which protects the right to self-determination, which allows one to develop
one’s personhood – or one’s identity and in essence part of one’s human dignity).
101. Id. (discussing freedoms that inherently allow for individuals to exercise their
fundamental rights).
102. Id. at 11 (relying on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child to stress
the importance of developing one’s individual identity and the duty of the State to
protect a child’s autonomy). Article Eight of the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child states:
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or
her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by
law without unlawful interference.
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or
her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and
protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 8, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res.
44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. doc A/44/736 (1989) [hereinafter
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child], available at http://www.ohchr.org/,
EN/Professional Interest/Pages/CRC.aspx.
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identity, and declared that the physicians had violated Y.Y.’s
rights.103
The Court further held that sex operations, without
consent, violate an individual’s right to develop his/her own
sexual identity.104 The Decision of Y.Y., therefore, established that
only the individual on whom gender assignment surgery will be
performed can give consent to the surgery, regardless of the age
of the individual.105 As a result, this case established a
moratorium in Colombia on the practice of genital-normalizing
surgery on infants and young children until they are old enough
to consent to surgery on their own.106
2. The Decision of X.X.
In the aftermath of The Decision of Y.Y., the Colombian
Constitutional Court issued two rulings in 1999 involving
intersex children—The Decision of X.X. and The Decision of N.N.107
Both teams of doctors in these cases had initially planned to
perform genital-normalizing operations during infancy, but
103. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 18.1
(translated by author) (upholding Colombia’s ratification of the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child as binding law).
104. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 15.1
(recognizing that sexual identity is an autonomous decision that is a part of one’s
fundamental right to develop their identity).
105. Id. at 15 (holding that all persons must be allowed to decide for themselves
whether they want to alter their sex or keep their natural genitalia).
106. See Haas, supra note 83, at 99 (observing that after The Decision of Y.Y.,
physicians still offered genital-normalizing surgery as a treatment method, but they
would not perform these surgeries on children with ambiguous genitalia even with
consenting parents); see also Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 (noting that physicians
mentioned genital-normalizing surgery with parents as a treatment option for intersex
infants but would not use this treatment because of The Decision of Y.Y.).
107. See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia
SU-337/99, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.); Corte Constitucional
[C.C] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia T-551/99, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional
[G.C.C.] (Colom.). The Constitutional Court of Colombia refers to the children as the
minor “X.X.” and the minor “N.N.” in order to protect their identity. When the court
delivered these decisions, both of the children had already begun to develop a female
gender identity, and the court uses feminine pronouns when referring to the minors
throughout the opinions. This Note also uses female pronouns when referring to the
minors in these cases to respect their gender identities. For an English translation of
the Court’s opinion in The Decision of X.X., see The Rights of Intersexed Infants and
Children: Decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court, Bogota, Colombia, 12 May 1999
(Nohemy Solórzano-Thompson trans.), in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 122–
38 [hereinafter Translation of the X.X. Decision].

798 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:777
then made the decision to postpone the surgeries until the
children became older and had developed gender identities.108
Although the parents were pressuring the physicians to perform
genital-normalizing surgery, the physicians refused to operate
on children who could not consent in accordance with the
Court’s 1995 holding in The Decision of Y.Y.109
In May 1999, the Court, in The Decision of X.X., held that a
parent’s decision to subject their children to genital-normalizing
surgery violates constitutional rights guaranteed to children and
the State by the Colombian Constitution.110 The Court relied
heavily on Article 18 of The United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which encourages countries to ensure that
parental actions take into account the best interests of their
children.111 The decision balanced a parent’s right to make
decisions on behalf of their child with a child’s right to be
emancipated from parental decisions that are not in the best
interests of the child.112 By declaring that children “possess their
own individuality and dignity, and constitute a developing
autonomy,” the Court created a basis for establishing legal rights
for intersex children from the potential harms of a procedure
that permanently alters their genitalia.113
108. See Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86
(observing Colombian physicians’ decisions in accordance with The Decision of Y.Y.).
Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 122 (describing the background for
The Decision of X.X.).
109. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86 (expressing
the possible prejudice of X.X.’s parents in forcing their child to have their genitals
altered).
110. See Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 71, 77
(declaring that the Article 44 of the Colombian Constitution confers an obligation to
the State and society “to assist and protect the child in order in order to guarantee
their harmonious and complete development and the full exercise of their rights”).
111. Id. at 68, 77 (utilizing the text from the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child to hold the State to a higher standard of protecting minors).
112. Id. at 68 (acknowledging the parent’s constitutional right to control their
home with the State’s obligation to ensure parents act upon the best interest of the
child); see Holmes, supra note 2, at 108 (suggesting that children should be liberated
from their parents the more the parents or guardians express prejudice towards their
child or an inability to understand their child’s situation).
113. Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 123; see Constitutional
Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 68 (asserting that children are not
simply the property of their parents and must have their best interests considered); see
also Holmes, supra note 2, at 108, 111 (interpreting the Court’s use of “developing
autonomy” as valuing the autonomy and future well-being of the child). Holmes notes
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The Decision of X.X. describes genital-normalizing surgery as
lacking urgency, risky, invasive, and ambivalent to health.114 The
Court also recognized that parents are often unable to
comprehend the idea of genital ambiguity and can be blinded
by their own fears and prejudices.115 This inevitably results in a
decision to normalize the child as quickly as possible without a
true concern for the best interests of the child.116 When parents
discover their child has ambiguous genitalia, medical
professionals and parents undermine true informed consent by
assuming that having the child’s genitals “fixed” is in the best
interests of the child.117 The Court introduced the idea of a
heightened standard for informed consent by declaring that
valid informed consent given by parents must be “qualified and
persistent.”118 The Court, however, failed to articulate the
meaning of “qualified and persistent” informed consent.119
The State’s interest in protecting the child’s best interests
ultimately became the justification for denying the mother’s
that the Court’s use of the language “a developing autonomy” does not imply that
children are completely independent from their parents, but rather should be afforded
freedom from their parents in certain circumstances.
114. See Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 123–24; see also
Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 68 (expressing that
genital-normalizing surgery is not urgent for any medical reason and provides no
health benefits to the child).
115. See Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 79
(alleging that parental opinions on genital ambiguity are rarely developed free from
the influence of outside sources).
116. See id. (contending that parents with intersex children endure severe trauma
from not understanding their child’s condition, desperately wanting to normalize the
child, and because our society does not openly discuss issues such as
“hermaphroditism”); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 87. (noting that culturallybiased recommendations and medical professionals acting outside of their expertise
contribute to a decision that does not concern the best interests of the child).
117. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 79
(conjecturing that infants with ambiguous genitalia are perhaps subjected to
discrimination from their own parents); see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 86 (noting
that genital-normalizing surgery is often presented to parents by doctors in a way that
suggests the procedure is a foregone conclusion).
118. See Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 131; see also
Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 83 (mentioning the
concept of “qualified and persistent” consent in the context of parental informed
consent for genital-normalizing procedures).
119. See Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, at 19
(translated by author) (stating that the Court in The Decision of X.X. did not discuss the
definition or requirements of “qualified and persistent” parental informed consent
because X.X.’s mother could not consent on her behalf under any circumstances).
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request for an order to disambiguate X.X.’s genitalia.120
Granting protection to the intersex minor, X.X., the
Constitutional Court stated, “it is the minor who should decide
on her gender identity . . . [T]he Court will protect the minor’s
right to freely develop her identity and equality . . . .”121 This
decision offers legal recognition of an intersex child’s autonomy
and identity and acknowledges the potential inadequacies of
parental consent as authorization for sex assignment surgery on
intersex children.122
3. The Decision of N.N.
Three months after The Decision of X.X., the Constitutional
Court of Colombia maintained the autonomy of an intersex
child in The Decision of N.N.123 In this case, N.N. was a two-yearold intersex child unable to give competent medical consent.124
According to The Decision of X.X., parents could give permission
for the normalization of their child’s genitals as long as the
informed consent was “qualified and persistent.”125 The Court
failed to articulate this standard in The Decision of X.X., but it did
so in The Decision of N.N.126 The N.N. Court declared that
“qualified and persistent” consent exists when parents are given
120. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 77
(upholding the State’s duty under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in
order to protect the best interests of the child).
121. See Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 136 (explaining why the
mother’s request for her daughter’s surgery was denied).
122. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 79, 89
(advocating for the rights of the minor who had not consented to surgery while
questioning the intentions of the parent’s desire to disambiguate their child’s
genitalia). See also Holmes, supra note 2, at 103 (concluding that the Constitutional
Court of Colombia suggested intersex children are entitled to special protection from
prejudice and parental consent that does not concern the best interests of the child).
123. See Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87 (denying
the parent’s petition for genital-normalizing surgery to be performed on the child).
124. Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, 15 (disclosing
the age of the intersex minor).
125. Id. at 15 (addressing the Court’s previous ruling in The Decision of X.X. that
articulated “qualified and persistent” consent); see Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra
note 107, at 130–31 (reconciling the parent’s and child’s rights to achieve an
equilibrium that creates a consensual decision which considers the best interests of the
child).
126. Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, at 22
(announcing the “qualified and persistent” consent standard because N.N. could not
give competent medical consent, therefore her parents could have consented for her).
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detailed information about the advantages and disadvantages of
surgically altering their child’s genitalia, are allowed ample
periods of time to consider the alternatives to genitalnormalizing surgery, and make decisions in consideration of
their child’s best interests.127
In The Decision of N.N., “qualified and persistent” consent
did not exist because N.N.’s parents were led to believe that
genital-normalizing surgery was the only option for their
daughter.128 The parents did not examine alternative options to
surgery; therefore, their decision did not consider the best
interests of the child.129 This decision promotes the autonomy of
intersex individuals by valuing the child’s fundamental right to
sexual identity over parents’ and doctors’ genital preferences.130
The Decision of N.N. requires a heightened standard of informed
consent and serves as precedent for Colombian families making
decisions regarding children with intersex conditions who
cannot make medical decisions for themselves.131 Further, the
Court promotes diversity by making a place for intersex
individuals in society.132 As stated in the conclusion of the
opinion, “it is the duty of all of us to listen to these people and
not only to learn to live with them but to learn from them.”133
127. Id. (translated by author) (outlining the new standard of informed consent
for genital-normalizing surgery on infants); see also Haas, supra note 83, at 53 (noting
that “qualified and persistent” consent truly concerns the best interests of the child).
128. Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, at 29–30
(deciding that the parent’s consent was invalid because they were not provided with
adequate information).
129. Id. (applying a strict application of the “qualified and persistent” rule). Haas,
supra note 83, at 52–53 (reiterating the invalid parental consent for N.N. because of the
lack of comprehension as to the implications of such a surgery).
130. Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, at 10
(requiring a very high standard of informed consent so that the child’s autonomy is
protected).
131. Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 (concluding that The Decision of N.N.
forces parents in Colombia to be informed of accurate information, germane risks, and
alternative options for sex assignment surgery). But see Haas, supra note 83 (concluding
The Decision of N.N. weakens the holding of the decision in The Decision of X.X. by
making clear only children five years of age or older can escape parental “qualified and
persistent” consent to genital-normalizing surgery).
132. Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, at 30
(recognizing that intersex autonomy is more important than the preservation of
gender norms).
133. Id. (translated by author) (quoting Dr. William Reiner to emphasize the
importance of diversity in society and of understanding marginalized communities).
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In sum, the Constitutional Court of Colombia in The
Decision of Y.Y. concluded that doctors may not perform sex
assignment surgery on any individual unless there is consent.134
Four years later, the Court in The Decision of X.X. retreated from
this broad holding by declaring that parents can give consent for
children who are not old enough to make competent decisions
as long as the consent is “qualified and persistent.”135 The
Decision of N.N. then affirmed The Decision of X.X. by holding that
parents can only give consent to genital-normalizing surgery for
children too young to make medical decisions and outlined the
requirements for “qualified and persistent” parental consent.136
B. The Cologne Regional Court of Germany
In 2008, Germany’s Cologne Regional Court decided
Völling, a case involving an operation that determined the sex of
Christiane Völling without her consent.137 The Völling decision
recognized the social and legal consequences of the surgeon’s
actions on Christiane Völling.138 Christiane Völling had been
born with ambiguous genitalia yet had been raised as a boy.139
Dr. Reiner is physician in the Division of Pediatric Urology and the Division of Child
Psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University. He is also a professor of Pediatrics at the
University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center specializing in intersex conditions.
Ethics of Gender Assignment, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org/–library/–
reinerprecepts (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (providing biographies of prominent intersex
advocates in the United States).
134. See Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85 (declaring
that only the individual himself can give consent to a medical procedure that
determines that individual’s sex or gender).
135. See Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86 (holding
that an eight-year-old child deserves protection from the potential harms of parental
consent to genital-normalizing surgery).
136. See Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87
(concluding that parents cannot give the requisite “qualified and persistent” consent
necessary for assigning a sex to their two-year-old child without being informed of
alternative intersex treatment options).
137. See generally Kölner Landgericht [Cologne District Court], 25 O 179/07,
06.02.2008 (holding that a surgeon violated the plaintiff’s fundamental rights to selfdetermination and to bodily integrity by removing the plaintiff’s sex organs without her
consent).
138. See id. at 2 (noting that not only did the defendant’s actions deny the
plaintiff’s right to self-determination, but they also compromised her health and
influenced aspects of her adult life such as gender identity).
139. German Gender-Assignment Case Has Intersexuals Hopeful, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.dw.de/german-gender-assignment-case-has-intersexuals-
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When Christiane was eighteen years old, a physician discovered
her complete female internal reproductive organs during a
routine appendectomy.140 Instead of informing Ms. Völling of
the discovery, the surgeon removed her uterus and ovaries
without her consent and did not tell her of the procedure.141
This operation permanently removed her ability to reproduce as
a female and produce estrogen.142 Thirty years after the
operation, Christiane successfully sued the physician for
removing her female reproductive organs without her
consent.143
The Cologne Regional Court found that by removing
Christiane’s ovaries, the surgeon denied her the ability to
produce her own sex hormones, to attain a life as a woman, to
self-identify as a woman, to experience a female sexuality, and to
attempt to procreate as a woman.144 As such, the physician had
“culpably violated her health and self-determination.”145 This
ruling recognizes that a surgical procedure that determines
one’s sex not only affects one’s physical health, but also is
inherently tied to that person’s autonomy—or right to selfdetermination.146 The Court found Ms. Völling’s doctor liable
hopeful/a-3000902-1 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (revealing that a midwife believed
Christiane’s clitoris was actually a penis); see AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84
(explaining that Christiane Völling was raised as a boy).
140. AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 (observing that Christiane had
identified as male since birth); see Cologne District Court, Case 25 O 179/07, (Ger.),
supra note 137 (noting that Christiane had a fully formed uterus and ovaries).
141. See Cologne District Court, Case 25 O 179/07, (Ger.), supra note 137
(indicating that the surgeon removed Christiane’s female reproductive organs upon
their discovery without consulting other medical professionals).
142. Cologne District Court, Case 25 O 179/07, (Ger.), supra note 137 (claiming
that this action’s permanence constituted a violation of the plaintiff’s fundamental
freedoms). AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 (indicating that the physician deprived
Christiane of her opportunity to bear a child).
143. See Cologne District Court, Case 25 O 179/07, (Ger.), supra note 137 (ruling
in favor of the plaintiff); see also AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 (explaining that
Christiane did not discover she was intersex until she received a pamphlet on
intersexuality in 2006). Thereafter, she learned of her physician’s actions and filed suit
against the physician the following year. Id.
144. Cologne District Court, Case 25 O 179/07, (Ger.), supra note 137 (spelling
out the future consequences of the surgeon’s actions).
145. Id. (translation on file with author) (commenting on the recklessness of the
procedure and its preclusion of allowing Christiane to make important life decisions).
146. Id. (explaining that when the doctor removed Völling’s ovaries, he took away
her means to live naturally as a woman and develop a female sexuality directly violating
her self-determination).
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for violating her health and right to self-determination,
awarding her EU€100,000 in damages and the costs of
litigation.147
C. The Self-Determination Doctrine in the United States
The right to self-determination is a common law concept in
the United States that recognizes that “sanctity of individual free
choice and self-determination are fundamental constituents of
life.”148 This safeguards “an individual’s strong personal interest
in directing the course of his own life . . . [and] an individual’s
right to behave and act as he deems fit, provided that such
behavior and activity do not conflict with the precepts of
society.”149 Most importantly, the right to self-determination
establishes that “the value of life may be lessened rather than
increased by the failure to allow a competent human being the
right of choice.”150 The right to self-determination is so
completely intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of
liberty that courts recognize that individuals are protected from
bodily intrusions that conflict with the interests protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.151

147. Id.
148. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223–24 (N.J. 1985) (holding that a
gastronasal feeding tube can be removed from an invalid nursing home resident if the
life-saving medical treatment is against the patient’s wishes or withholding the lifesustaining treatment is in their best interests); see also Marguerite Anne Chapman, The
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act: Too Little, Too Late?, 42 ARK. L. REV. 319, 324
(1989) (characterizing the right to self-determination as “the right to decide what will
or what will not be done to one’s body”).
149. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 453 (N.J. 1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985)) (declaring that the objective of
judicial action in medical treatment decisions is to preserve the patient’s right to selfdetermination).
150. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224.
151. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287–88 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (articulating that the liberty interest results from
individuals making decisions regarding the State’s invasions of the body). See e.g.,
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (holding that the State cannot surgically
intrude one’s body to recover criminal evidence because it violates that individual’s
right to privacy and security); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
(concluding that forcibly retrieving contents swallowed by an individual violates his due
process of law).
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D. The Crawford Case
The Crawford case is a case of first impression in the United
States, as M.C. is the first intersex plaintiff to assert
constitutional claims in a federal court against a defendant for
performing genital-normalizing surgery.152 Crawford is currently
being litigated in the US District Court for the District of South
Carolina.153 As of March 2014, the parties are engaging in
discovery and preparing to file motions for summary
judgment.154
On May 14, 2013, an eight-year-old plaintiff, M.C., filed a
complaint by and through his parents, Pamela and Mark
Crawford.155 The complaint alleged that the doctors who
performed genital-normalizing surgery on him when he was
sixteen months old violated his constitutional rights.156 This is
the first cause of action in the United States that seeks legal
redress for the harm caused by genital-normalizing surgery
performed on an intersex infant.157

152. See generally Crawford Complaint, supra note 10 (alleging that a sex assignment
operation deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights to liberty, privacy, and
bodily integrity); see also Haas, supra note 83 (noting that many countries across the
world including the United States have not addressed intersex issues in the court
system).
153. See generally Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, M.C. v. Aaronson, No.
2:13CV01303 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Crawford Order] (granting plaintiff’s
motion for expedited discovery upon denying defendant’s motion to dismiss).
154. See Docket Proceedings, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13CV01303 (D.S.C. 2013)
(showing various motions from the parties but no motion for summary judgment).
155. See Crawford Order, supra note 153 (using “M.C.” to protect the minor’s
identity and indicating the plaintiff brought this cause of action through his parents).
156. See id. (including the rights to bodily integrity, privacy, procreation, and
liberty). M.C. also filed a cause of action against his physicians in South Carolina’s
County of Richland Court of Common Pleas alleging gross negligence and medical
malpractice based on lack of informed consent. While this Note discusses the doctrine
of informed consent in the context of genital-normalizing surgery, it will not analyze
M.C.’s state claims but rather focus on its relationship to his federal constitutional
claims. See Colleen Jenkins, Couple Sues Over Adopted Son’s Sex-Assignment Surgery,
WESTLAW J. MED. MALPRACTICE 4, May 23, 2013, at *1–2 (discussing the M.C. v.
Aaronson lawsuit and its current proceedings).
157. See Groundbreaking SPLC Lawsuit Accuses South Carolina, Doctors and Hospitals of
Unnecessary Surgery on Infant, S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/news/groundbreaking-splc-lawsuit-accuses-south-carolina-doctors-andhospitals-of-uN.N.ece (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). The Southern Poverty Law Center
filed this lawsuit on behalf of M.C., naming Greenville Hospital System, Medical
University of South Carolina, and individual employees as defendants.
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M.C. was born prematurely in December 2004 with both
male and female internal reproductive organs—known as a
“true hermaphroditism.”158 Doctors initially identified M.C. as a
male based on the overall physical appearance of his genitalia
but concluded that M.C. could develop normally whether he was
raised as a boy or a girl.159 M.C.’s biological parents had given up
their parental rights by putting him up for adoption shortly after
he was released from the hospital, and the South Carolina
Department of Social Services (“SCDSS”) had taken custody of
M.C. on February 16, 2005.160 The SCDSS had maintained
custody and the right to make decisions regarding medical
treatment for M.C. until his adoptive parents gained custody on
December 11, 2006.161
While the SCDSS had custody of M.C., doctors at the
Medical University of South Carolina routinely examined M.C.
to determine his sex.162 On April 26, 2005, a doctor observed
that one of M.C.’s gonads resembled an ovary and the other
resembled a testis.163 After months of testing and examinations,
M.C.’s primary physicians were unable to make a conclusive
determination of whether M.C. was male or female.164 In January
2006, M.C.’s doctors concluded in their medical records that sex
assignment surgery was neither urgent nor necessary and that
M.C. had the potential to identify as a boy or a girl as he
developed throughout childhood.165
Over the next several months, M.C.’s team of physicians
ultimately decided—without explanation—that he should be
raised as a girl and assigned him the female sex by removing his

158. Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, para. 3 (specifying that M.C.’s specific
condition is ovotesticular DSD). Medical records indicate that M.C. was born with a
“rather large” phallus, significantly high testosterone levels, a vaginal opening below
the phallus, and a “scrotalized labia.” Id. at 41. (revealing that M.C. was also born with a
twin sister who died several months after birth due to complications from prematurity).
159. Id. para. 3 (describing M.C.’s genitalia as stated in his medical records).
160. Id. para. 38 (explaining that the State acted as guardian for M.C. during the
time doctors treated his intersex condition).
161. Id.
162. Id. para. 42–46 .
163. Id. para. 42 (detailing M.C.’s “ambiguous genitalia”).
164. Id. para. 43 (noting that M.C.’s condition was impossible to determine).
165. Id. paras. 43, 46.
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phallus and constructing a hollowed vagina in his groin.166 On
April 18, 2006, Dr. Aaronson, one of M.C.’s primary physicians,
removed M.C.’s phallus and excised most, if not all, of his male
reproductive tissue.167 Four months later, in August 2006, Pam
and Mark Crawford took custody of M.C. and legally adopted
him in December 2006.168 They then brought this suit on behalf
of M.C. to “vindicate his rights” and speak out against the
practice of genital normalizing surgery.169
M.C.’s complaint alleges that the physicians and the social
workers who consented to his surgery violated his “substantive
due process rights to bodily integrity, privacy, procreation, and
liberty, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.”170 He asserts that by assigning him a sex
and selecting a gender for him, the physician-defendants
“usurped . . . intimate and profound decisions from [him] when
he was barely older than an infant” and that their actions
“interfered with [his] future ability to form intimate, procreative
relationships, choices central to his personal dignity and
autonomy.”171 M.C. also raises a procedural due process claim
that his rights to bodily integrity, privacy, procreation, and
liberty were deprived because the physicians operated on him
“without requesting, initiating, or inquiring as to a predeprivation hearing.”172 The District Court Judge denied the
166. Id. para. 49 (pointing out that the doctors who decided M.C.’s sex proffered
no specific reason for their determination).
167. Id. para. 51 n.1 (noting that in 2001, a pediatric journal published an article
written by the defendant, Dr. Ian Aaronson, which stated that “carrying out a
feminizing genitoplasty on an infant who might eventually identify herself as a boy
would be catastrophic.”); see Ian A. Aaronson, The Investigation and Management of the
Infant with Ambiguous Genitalia: A Surgeon’s Perspective, 31 CURR. PROBL. PEDIAT. 168
(2001) (contemplating the disastrous results that would occur from assigning a child to
a sex that does not match their gender identity).
168. Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, para. 17 (providing a timeline of M.C.’s
custodians).
169. Id. para. 12 (stating the Crawfords’ reasons for bringing this action as found
in the preliminary statement); see also SPLCenter, The Crawfords Speak About
http://www.youtube.com/
Groundbreaking
Intersex
Case,
YOUTUBE,
watch?v=0qH4P5PtC4w (explaining why M.C.’s parents filed this lawsuit).
170. Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 72, 74, 77 (listing M.C.’s specific
constitutional claims).
171. Id. at 9–10 (introducing the fundamental concepts of how genitalnormalizing surgery deprived him of constitutional rights).
172. Id. at 82 (asserting violations of procedural due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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physician-defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified
immunity on August 22, 2013.173 The Judge concluded that the
doctrine of qualified immunity did not apply to M.C.’s doctors
as government officials because they violated his constitutional
right to procreation when they performed genital-normalizing
surgery on him.174 The parties are currently participating in the
discovery process as litigation for the Crawford case continues.
E. Alternative Policies & Pragmatic Approaches
Rulings such as Völling and The Decision of Y.Y. represent
progressive attitudes toward recognizing intersex autonomy, but
the judiciary is not the sole source for countries to expand rights
of the intersex individual. Germany has taken the initiative to
acknowledge the intersex community, and in 2010 charged its
Ethics Council to develop an official position on intersex issues,
including discrimination and living situations.175 In 2011, the
Council announced its three main findings: (1) intersex
individuals have a right to “physical integrity,” and genitalnormalizing surgery ought to be delayed as long as possible; (2)
intersex individuals’ right to self-determination precludes
parental consent to genital-normalizing procedures from being
absolute; and (3) the rights to self-determination and protection
from discrimination provide freedom for all intersex persons

173. See Crawford Order, supra note 153, at 1, 6 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(explaining that the “doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
performing discretionary functions ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known’”).
174. Id. at 8–10 (concluding that because M.C. has an “absent uterus” and his
doctors removed his male reproductive organs, the defendants violated M.C.’s
constitutional right to procreation).
175. An Ethics Council is an administrative body in Member States of the
European Union that serves as a national platform for dialogue about medical, ethical,
and social issues in the life sciences. Council Directive 2001/20/EC, art. 2(k), 2001 O.J.
(L 121) (E.C.) 34 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. The German Ethics Council, established on
June 8, 2001, “provides an umbrella for interdisciplinary discourse relating to science,
medicine, theology, philosophy, and the social and legal sciences, expressing its views
on both the ethical aspects of new developments in the life sciences and their impact
on individuals and society as a whole.” Ethically Speaking, EUROPEAN COMM., Jan. 2007,
at
28,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-ethics/docs/
ethspeakweb_8_en.pdf; see AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 (discussing efforts to
promote the understanding of specific minority groups).

2014]

PREFERRED PRIVATE PARTS

809

from being forced to choose for themselves a sex in the
exclusive categories of the male-female gender binary.176
The German government determined that hardships facing
intersex persons is a social issue and implemented a practical,
bureaucratic solution to remedy these problems.177 Germany has
already seen results from its actions.178 In April 2011, a bill was
introduced before the German Parliament calling for
institutionalized education on intersex issues and a moratorium
on genital-normalizing surgeries used to treat intersex infants,
however, the legislation never passed.179
A novel administrative approach to the protection of the
rights of intersex individuals is found in Germany’s inclusion of
an option for a “third sex” on birth certificates.180 This unique
practice, implemented on November 1, 2013, promotes the
autonomy of the intersex individual by departing from the strict
legal recognition of only those who fit within the male-female
biological sex binary.181 Further, New Zealand, Nepal, Australia,
and Uruguay offer their citizens passports with a third gender
option beyond the traditional male-female categories.182 This is
another example of a mechanism outside of the judicial arena
176. AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 85 (recalling the Council’s conclusions).
177. Id. (noting the progressive measures taken by Germany’s government to
bolster awareness and equality for the intersex community).
178. Id. (following Germany’s rapid response to the rise in the awareness of
intersex issues).
179. Id. (discussing radical legislation that would enforce complete autonomy and
consciousness of intersexuality).
180. Eric Cameron, Germany Adds Third Gender Option to Birth Certificates, HRC
BLOG (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/germany-adds-third-genderoption-to-birth-certificates (reporting another effort by Germany to depart from the
convention of the strict male-female sex binary); see Jacinta Nandi, Germany Got It Right
by Offering a Third Gender Option on Birth Certificates, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 10,
2013, 6:30 AM, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/10/germanythird-gender-birth-certificate (commenting on Germany’s implementation of a
progressive policy on gender and intersex issues).
181. See Cameron, supra note 180 (noting Germany’s progressive efforts toward
accommodating the intersex community); see also AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84–
85 (2012) (encouraging other European nations to follow in Germany’s footsteps).
182. Michael Bochenek & Kyle Knight, Establishing a Third Gender Category in
Nepal: Process and Prognosis, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 11, 24–26 (2012) (discussing several
national governments’ efforts to address transgender and intersex populations); see
Zach Gordon, Nepal’s Third Gender and the Recognition of Gender Identity, THE JURIST
(Apr. 23, 2012, 5:04 PM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/04/bochenek-knightgender.php (investigating Nepal’s protection of transgender and intersex individuals
with its third gender category on official identification documents).
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that countries can adopt to recognize its citizens who are
intersex or otherwise gender-variant.
III. DEVELOPING THE CRAWFORD RULE: IMPORTING
AUTONOMY FROM COLOMBIA AND GERMANY
Part III uses court decisions of the Constitutional Court of
Colombia and Germany’s Cologne Regional Court to argue that
the South Carolina District Court should hold in Crawford that
genital-normalizing surgery violated M.C.’s constitutional right
to liberty. Part III.A explains how genital-normalizing surgery
implicates fundamental rights of the intersex individual by
examining The Decision of Y.Y. and proposes a standard for
evaluating M.C.’s constitutional claims. Part III.B then evaluates
the best interests of intersex children by comparing the facts,
holdings, and reasoning of the Colombia and Germany
decisions to Crawford. Part III.C argues that the Crawford court
should, in its eventual holding, establish broader protection for
children with ambiguous genitalia than did Colombia’s holdings
in The Decision of X.X. and The Decision of Y.Y.
A. Constitutional Implications
The Constitutional Court of Colombia’s opinion in The
Decision of Y.Y. declared that when fundamental rights are at
stake, a “constitutional dimension” arises on the issue of consent
in the patient-doctor relationship with regards to genitalnormalizing procedures.183 The Court articulated that the facts
of the case must be matched with the fundamental rights at
issue—the right to identity and the right to develop one’s own
person.184 The surgery performed on Y.Y. violated his right to
self-determination because it did not allow him to “freely
develop his identity,” just as the surgery performed on M.C.
denied him the right to develop an identity on his own.185
183. Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], octubre 23, 1995,
Sentencia T-477/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. , p. ) (Colom.), at
10 (noting the constitutional interests at play for intersex individuals who face genitalnormalizing procedures).
184. Id. at 14 (noting that the surgery that transformed Y.Y. into an anatomical
female implicated constitutional freedoms).
185. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (illustrating the right to identity’s
interwoven relationship with the right to self-determination). See Crawford Complaint,
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The German court in Völling held that the doctor deprived
Christiane of her right to self-determination by taking away her
opportunity to self-identify as a woman and violated her bodily
integrity.186 This case suggests that a surgery that modifies an
individual’s sex organs without their consent greatly affects that
individual’s perception of their own biological sex, gender
identity, sexual orientation, and procreative capabilities in a
morally and legally unprincipled manner.187 The surgery
performed on Christiane violated her right to self-determination
because it did not allow her to physically develop as a woman,
just as M.C.’s surgery did not allow him to choose to develop as a
boy.188
The Decision of Y.Y. and Völling are particularly similar to the
facts in Crawford because Y.Y. and Christiane Völling brought
their suits years after learning of their genital-normalizing
surgery.189 Although Christiane Völling was not an infant when
her physician operated on her, and Y.Y. was not intersex, the
outcomes of these cases and the courts’ respect for the plaintiffs’
self-determination can be helpful in understanding the rights of
M.C.190 Genital-normalizing surgery affects every intersex
individual’s right to liberty, unless they gave consent to have the
procedure performed.191 Parental fears and prejudices involved
in the decision making process inevitably result in a choice to
normalize the child as quickly as possible without a true concern
supra note 10, paras. 7–9 (asserting that the defendant physicians modified M.C.’s body
to make it appear female by permanently removing his male sex organs).
186. See supra Part II.B (discussing how the surgeon stripped the plaintiff of the
right to freedom of choice as an adult to procreate and develop an identity as a
woman).
187. See supra Part II.B (analyzing in Völling the biological, psychological, social,
and legal harms caused by a nonessential surgery that altered the plaintiff’s sex
organs).
188. See supra notes 141–144, 171, 174 and accompanying text (discussing
Christiane and M.C.’s loss of procreative capabilities due to genital-normalizing
surgery).
189. See supra Part II.D (describing how M.C. sued his physicians at eight years of
age for a surgery that was performed on him during infancy).
190. See supra Part II (examining the Colombian and German cases involving an
operation that assigned a sex to the plaintiff affecting that individual’s right to selfdetermination); AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 (highlighting the importance of
the right to self-determination for individuals who are not allowed the opportunity to
develop a personal identity).
191. See supra Part II.C–.D (contemplating the connection between an individual’s
liberty and that individual’s decision to surgically alter their genitalia).
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for the best interests of the child.192 When parents discover that
their child has ambiguous genitalia, medical professionals and
parents undermine true informed consent by assuming that
having the child’s genitals “fixed” is in the best interests of the
child.193
Current informed consent does not consider a minor’s best
interests in the context of genital-normalizing surgery on
intersex newborns, therefore the right to self-determination
cannot be protected.194 Like the doctor who failed to inform
Christiane Völling of her natural reproductive organs, M.C.’s
physicians violated his right to self-determination by assigning
him the female sex without his consent.195 Christiane Völling was
not given the opportunity to learn she could live as a woman,
and her physician stole her right to procreate as a woman with
her natural reproductive organs.196 Genital-normalizing surgery
likewise robbed M.C. of the opportunity to live naturally as a
male and denied his right to procreate with his natural
reproductive organs.197
Genital-normalizing surgery tragically affected M.C. and
infringed upon his fundamental rights at the tender age of
sixteen months.198 Colombia’s ruling in The Decision of Y.Y. and

192. See supra notes 97–99, 145–147 and accompanying text (discussing the
conclusions of The Decision of Y.Y. and the Völling courts, which found genitalnormalizing surgery to infringe on the individuals’ autonomy); see Tamar-Mattis, supra
note 8, at 87 (noting that culturally-biased recommendations and medical professionals
acting outside of their expertise contribute to a decision that does not concern the best
interests of the child); Lee, supra note 26 (promoting immediate surgery in order to
normalize the child).
193. See supra Part II.A.2 (observing The Decision of X.X.’s discussion on parental
prejudices regarding ambiguous genitalia); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 86
(explaining that genital-normalizing surgery is often presented to parents by doctors in
a way that suggests the procedure is a foregone conclusion).
194. See supra notes 59–62, 183–185 and accompanying text (showing that the
standard practice of treating intersex infants does not consider the true best interests of
the child because it still harbors Dr. Money’s flawed theory of psychosexual neutrality
and aims to preserve social norms).
195. See supra, Part II.B (recounting a genital-altering surgery that was kept secret
from an individual as a violation of that person’s right to self-determination).
196. See supra Part II.B (reviewing the Völling decision).
197. See supra Part II.D (observing that physicians removed M.C.’s male
reproductive tissue during the surgery that constructed his female genitalia).
198. See supra Part III.A (discussing the constitutional implications of genitalnormalizing surgery and describing how the doctrine of informed consent fails as a
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Germany’s Völling decision demonstrate how disambiguating a
child’s genitalia and selecting a sex for them without their
consent implicates fundamental liberty interests.199 These cases
conceptualize the problematic nature of this medical practice
and provide a standard for analyzing M.C.’s constitutional
claims. Like the Colombian and German courts, US courts can
examine specific issues which address the extent to which the
surgery (1) violated M.C.’s right to self-determination, (2)
precluded M.C. from developing an identity, and (3) was
medically unnecessary.200 It is clear that no guardian can give
consent for such a surgery without ignoring the best interests of
the child.201
B. Evaluating M.C.’s Best Interests
Part III.B explores the constitutionality of genitalnormalizing surgery in the context of Crawford by analyzing the
urgency of M.C.’s surgery and the degree to which it deprived
him of his right to self-determination and to develop an identity.
In Part III.B.1, this Note analyzes The Decision of Y.Y. and Völling
and compares them to Crawford to evaluate the extent to which
genital-normalizing surgery violated M.C.’s right to selfdetermination. Part III.B.2 discusses the reasoning in The
Decision of Y.Y. and the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child to demonstrate how denying an individual the freedom to
develop their identity violates their constitutional right to
liberty. Part III.B.3 uses the holdings of The Decision of X.X. and

protection for one’s right to self-determination within the context of this medical
procedure).
199. See supra notes 171–178 and accompanying text (noting that invasive
procedures that alter sexual organs implicate the right to procreate and the right to
self-determination).
200. Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], octubre 23, 1995,
Sentencia T-477/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. , p. ) (Colom.), at
22 (analyzing the urgency, danger, and deprivation of fundamental rights to rule in
favor of Y.Y.); see Kölner Landgericht [Cologne District Court], 25 O 179/07,
06.02.2008 (assessing the right to self-determination to conclude that the surgery
violated Christiane’s fundamental liberty interests).
201. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.) at 14 (listing three factors
that determine the limits of informed consent for genital normalizing surgery: 1) the
impact of the procedure on the child’s current and future autonomy; 2) the urgency
and importance of the procedure for the child; and 3) the age of the child).
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Völling to argue that choosing a sex for intersex infants is
unnecessary and deprives intersex children of their autonomy.
1. The Right to Self-determination
The Constitutional Court of Colombia protected the
Colombian minor from the “invasive and risky” surgery after
doctors refused to normalize X.X.’s genitals without her
consent.202 The physicians in South Carolina did not exercise
such caution in M.C.’s case and took action that immensely
affected his best interests.203 Like the Constitutional Court in
Colombia, courts in the United States ought to acknowledge the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which declares
“[p]arents or . . . legal guardians, have the primary responsibility
for the upbringing and development of the child. The best
interests of the child will be their basic concern.”204 This
principle emphasizes the rights of individuals too young to
speak for themselves to be free from medical and parental
intervention of their body.205
M.C.’s doctors had no medical reason to operate on him,
and performing an arbitrary sex assignment on a child that
permanently deprives him of constitutional guarantees cannot
be said to consider the best interests of the child.206 The
defendants in the Crawford case violated M.C.’s right to selfdetermination by denying him the choice to retain his male
genitalia or to self-identify as an adult male with functional
sexual organs.207 M.C. relies on the principle that liberty is

202. See Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 123 (characterizing
genital-normalizing procedures as dangerous).
203. See Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, para. 5 (recalling that physicians
removed M.C.’s phallus and male reproductive tissue); id. at 123 (classifying a
procedure that “normalizes” a child’s genitalia as dangerous, greatly interfering with
an individual’s body, and affecting the best interests of the child).
204. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (presenting the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child).
205. See UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 102 (admonishing
nation-states to look after minor children who cannot look after themselves).
206. See supra notes 186–187, 190–191 and accompanying text (explaining that a
medically unnecessary procedure that precludes an individual from constructing their
own social and physical identity disregards that individual’s interest in his own liberty).
207. See Kölner Landgericht [Cologne District Court], 25 O 179/07, 06.02.2008
(holding that the physician defendants violated the plaintiff’s right to self-
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intertwined with self-determination to assert that doctors
violated his right to liberty and to bodily integrity by performing
genital-normalizing surgery on him without his consent.208
2. Developing an Identity
In The Decision of Y.Y., medical professionals castrated the
plaintiff just like physicians did to M.C.209 Y.Y. rejected the sex
and gender assigned to him as he went through childhood, and
as a teenager learned what was done to him as an infant.210 As an
analogous scenario has played out in the United States, the
District of South Carolina should examine the extent to which
these surgeries affect individuals’ identities just as Colombia did
nearly two decades ago.211
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child played a
role in the Court’s analysis in The Decision of Y.Y. by conferring a
duty upon Colombia to “respect the right of the child to
preserve his or her identity . . . [and to] provide appropriate
assistance and protection” when someone unlawfully interferes
with particular elements or all of the child’s identity.212 Denying
an individual the freedom to develop their identity violates their
right to self-determination.213 By violating M.C.’s selfdetermination, the physicians implicated his constitutional
freedom of liberty.214

determination by permanently removing her female sex organs and taking away her
free choice to self-identify as an adult woman with a female sexual identity).
208. See supra Part II.C–.D (explaining liberty’s link with self-determination and
reviewing M.C.’s procedural and due process claims against his physicians for violating
his constitutional right to liberty and bodily integrity).
209. See supra Part II.A, II.D (detailing the surgeries of M.C. and Y.Y.).
210. See supra Part II.A (describing the torment experienced by Y.Y. because of the
mismatch between his gender identity and sex).
211. See supra Part II.A (discussing how the Constitutional Court of Colombia
recognized the harms imposed on intersex children when their sex is determined
without soliciting their input).
212. See supra Part II.A (noting that Colombia upheld its duty conferred by Article
8 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child).
213. See supra notes 171, 174 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the
intersex individual’s fundamental rights to identity, autonomy, self-determination, and
liberty are connected in the context of genital-normalizing surgery).
214. See supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text (explaining that selfdetermination affects one’s identity, which is inherently tied to liberty).
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3. The Timing of Surgery
The Crawford court should import the analysis from The
Decision of X.X. to hold that there is harm facing intersex infants
because of genital-normalizing surgery that has no impact on
the child’s health.215 The Colombian jurisprudence on this issue
begins an analysis that lays the foundation for complete intersex
autonomy by conceding that “parents cannot force their
children to undergo risky surgeries or treatments that do not
produce health benefits.”216 The tragedy that happened to M.C.
demonstrates why the United States should use Colombia’s
decision in The Decision of X.X. as an example to extend
protections by recognizing the autonomy of intersex minors. As
M.C.’s mother, Pamela Crawford, put it
We feel very strongly that these decisions to permanently
alter somebody’s genitalia and their reproductive ability for
no medical reason whatsoever is an abhorrent practice and
can’t be continued . . . . It is too late for our son . . . . The
damage has been done to him.217

C. The Crawford Outcome
To interpret The Decision of X.X. as a clear victory for the
medical treatment of the intersex community would be to
ignore an important aspect of the decision—an aspect that still
harbors the flawed assumption of Dr. John Money’s theory. The
decision asserted that because X.X. was eight years old the
urgent need for surgery was “eliminated,” therefore a genitalnormalizing procedure “represents a greater invasion of her

215. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting the lack of urgency and
health benefits to individuals who receive genital-normalizing surgery).
216. Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia SU-337/99,
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. , p. ) (Colom.) 68; see supra notes 104–
105 and accompanying text (discussing the Constitutional Court of Colombia’s
recognition of intersex autonomy in the unique circumstances of genital-normalizing
surgery).
217. Jenkins, supra note 156 (quoting M.C.’s mother on thoughts about sex
assignment procedures for intersex children). To hear M.C.’s parents discuss the
lawsuit, see The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, supra note 169
(spelling out the theory that children will successfully adapt to whichever sex is
assigned to them as an infant because they are psychosexually neutral at birth).
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autonomy.”218 The opinion suggests there can be instances when
a parent gives valid consent to a surgical remedy of their child’s
ambiguous genitalia as well as circumstances where it is
impossible for a parent to give legal consent to genitalnormalizing surgery for their intersex child.219 This distinction
between “true” informed consent and unconstitutional parental
consent hinges on an inquiry the court examined but did not
fully resolve: when is a parent’s consent to surgery as treatment
for an intersex child invalidated by the autonomy of the child?220
In The Decision of X.X., the Colombian Court found that
postponing surgery did not violate the parent’s constitutional
right to privacy of the home because allowing the child to
develop a gender identity privileged “the minor’s autonomy
within the home.”221 According to the Court, a child of eighteen
months would not merit the privileges of autonomy within the
home, thereby not securing the right to develop her identity and
the opportunity to develop her gender identity.222 The Court
makes the assumption that genital-normalization surgery on a
newborn child is less violative of that child’s autonomy and right
to self-determination because there is a possibility that the child
will develop a gender identity that matches the genitalia chosen
for them.223 It is a paradox to protect a child’s autonomy
because that child can consent to medical procedures, while
218. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 88–90 (suggesting that
parents can consent to genital-normalizing surgery for their children who do not
understand the concept of gender but cannot for children who do understand such a
concept).
219. Id. at 86–89, 90–91 (purporting that an infant’s inability to give informed
consent provides doctors and parents with the right to surgically choose a physical sex
for the intersex child).
220. Id. at 90 (inquiring “at what age can we presume the psychological changes
have occurred that invalidate a paternal surrogate consent to treat the genital
ambiguity of the minor X.X.?”).
221. Id. at 87 (balancing the intersex child’s autonomy with the parent’s right to
make decisions for their children).
222. Id. at 88. (citing psychological studies that suggest at the age of five an
individual completes the “preoperational” stage, where a sense of self has not fully
formed, and develops intelligence and a sense of consciousness). But see Holmes, supra
note 2, at 116 (arguing that this decision creates an arbitrary protocol for permitting
potentially traumatic genital-normalizing procedures on infants while protecting older
children from the harmful surgery).
223. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 88–90 (exemplifying Dr.
Money’s antiquated and flawed theory that children will develop genders which match
their assigned genitalia).

818 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:777
proposing that the same protection from a forced, invasive, and
unnecessary medical procedure should not extend to a child
who cannot make medical decisions for themselves.224
Sex assignment surgery on an infant employs the
assumption that an immediate selection of a specific sex is best
for the child, but it does not consider the devastating effect it
might have on the child if the sex selection does not match the
gender the child develops.225 The chances of forcing a child to
live in the “wrong sex” are much higher when a sex
determination is made at infancy than when a child has already
created a gender identity, but the Colombian Court ignores this
fact.226 A forced sex assignment surgery deprives an infant just as
much of their autonomy, right to self-determination, and legal
protections under the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child.227
The complaint in Crawford highlights the potential
infringement of fundamental rights and detrimental effects of
the current medical treatment for intersex infants.228 Such early
surgeries undermine the intersex individual’s right to selfdetermination and autonomy because the procedures disregard
224. See id. (reasoning that a child of five years merits more protection than an
infant from a medically unnecessary surgery that potentially deprives the child of their
rights to procreate, to self-determination, and to identity); See Holmes, supra note 2,
116–17 (arguing that this decision only protects children whose genital ambiguity is
discovered past the infancy stage where making competent medical decisions becomes
more of a possibility).
225. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 86–86 (reasoning that a
sex assignment surgery on an individual who is aware of their body has the potential to
proundly affect the individual’s identity without analyzing the effects of the same
procedure on an infant). See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 71 (noting the inconsistency
in a surgery that is performed in the best interests of the child yet has no empirical or
anecdotal evidence to show the goals of such surgery are achieved).
226. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 83 (assuming genitalnormalizing surgery constitutes a greater invasion of a child’s autonomy the older they
are). But see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 65–66 (arguing that genital-normalizing
surgery is never urgent—even at infancy. It is the parent’s discomfort and shock that
their child is not normal, which creates the immediate need for sex assignment
surgery).
227. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 86–87 (declaring that
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires a child to consent for
themselves to a surgery that alters their genitalia).
228. See Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 9–10 (naming the issues of
irreversability, privacy, dignity, autonomy, procreative relationships, and sterilization);
supra Part III.A (considering the conflict between sex assignment surgery and
fundamental rights).
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the potential violation of fundamental rights.229 Colombia’s case
of the minor X.X. and Germany’s Völling decision specifically
protect the freedoms that M.C. claims he was deprived of by
genital-normalization surgery.230
When the policy from The Decision of X.X. plays out,
parental decisions to use surgery as intersex treatment continue
to implicate the child’s fundamental rights.231 The Court
concluded that genital-normalizing surgery markedly affects a
child’s best interests and is inherently unnecessary, but it does
not explain why parental consent for the surgery sought on an
infant is acceptable while it is not for an older child.232 The
Court states a general principle that “[t]he rights of parents over
their children are based only on their ability to protect the
rights of the minor, so that the minor can develop as an
autonomous person,” but it does not illustrate how parents
consenting to a procedure that permanently alters their infant’s
genitalia does not infringe upon the minor’s rights.233
According to the theory articulated by the Court in The
Decision of X.X., doctors can perform genital-normalizing surgery
on infants like M.C. through informed consent from the minor’s
parent or guardian because an intersex infant is a “developing
autonomy” incapable of making competent medical decisions.234
229. Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 9–10 (alleging that the physicians’
and social workers’ actions “constituted an egregious, arbitrary, and enduring invasion
of M.C.’s bodily integrity.”); see supra Part II.A–.B (discussing the deprivation of the
right to an identity, autonomy, and the right to self-determination, in The Decision of
Y.Y., The Decision of X.X., and Völling).
230. See Kölner Landgericht [Cologne District Court], 25 O 179/07, 06.02.2008
(concluding that a surgery which is medically unnecessary and affects intimate
decisions such as procreation compromises the patient’s bodily integrity and right to
self-determination); see also Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.) at 68, 91
(concluding that genital-normalizing surgery greatly affects a child’s autonomy).
231. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 88–90 (suggesting that
normalizing an infant’s genitalia when parents give “qualified and persistent” consent
is constitutional).
232. See id. (noting that since the plaintiff was eight years old the urgency of
surgically determining her sex so she has the opportunity to identify with a gender that
matches her genitalia had disappeared).
233. See Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 123 (describing the
detrimental effects of parents deciding to alter an intersex child’s genitalia but not
applying this logic to intersex infants).
234. See supra Part II.A (classifying infants as not completely autonomous
individuals). See also supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
protection of a child’s right to freely develop their identity and choose a gender
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This outcome is inadequate because it does not protect
individuals like M.C., and to protect intersex infants’
constitutional rights, the Crawford holding needs to go further
than the Constitutional Court in Colombia’s holding in The
Decision of X.X.235
The law must abandon the conclusion that children are
psychosexually neutral and that genital-normalizing surgery on
intersex infants is not a harmful procedure.236 Crawford presents
the United States with an opportunity to denounce an unethical
medical practice that is based on an incorrect theory.237 By
modifying natural anatomy that has been deemed socially
unacceptable, genital-normalizing surgery isolates individuals
like M.C. who do not conform to the traditional ideas of male
and female and violates their fundamental right to liberty.238 If
M.C. prevails, a constitutionally protected fundamental right to
liberty would protect all intersex individuals incapable of
medical consent from the harmful and arbitrary practice of
genital-normalizing surgery.239
CONCLUSION
The German and Colombian jurisprudence examined in
this Note have set the tone for international human rights in the
intersex context and can provide guidance for US courts,
specifically in application to the Crawford case. The enactment of
third sex categories on birth certificates and passports marks a
identity as long as they are of an age that allows them to make competent medical
decisions).
235. See supra notes 224–226 and accompanying text (examining the policy
created by The Decision of X.X., which protects children who can consent to surgery but
not those who cannot make competent medical decisions).
236. See supra Part I.C (explaining Dr. Money’s theory that early genitalnormalizing surgery offers intersex individuals the opportunity to live a normal life
because they can develop a gender identity to match the sex chosen for them at
infancy).
237. See supra Part II.D (revealing that AAP guidelines still promote early surgery
to disambiguate intersex children’s genitalia).
238. See supra Part III.B (analyzing the best interests of M.C. to show that his
genital-normalizing violated his right to self-determination thereby depriving him of his
liberty).
239. See supra notes 202–203, 206–207, 230 (arguing that the best interests of the
child do not allow for anyone to consent to genital-normalizing surgery except the
individual herself).
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movement away from the harmful male-female gender binary.
This also encourages a delay in genital-normalizing surgery to
allow all persons the opportunity to determine their own sex
and gender instead of having a harmful sex determination
forced upon them from birth—one which, may in fact, be
inconsistent with their actual gender. The phenomenon of
recognizing fundamental rights for intersex individuals to
protect them from an ethically-flawed medical practice is on the
brink of introduction into the US legal framework. The
application of this progressive international thinking to the
Crawford case would promote human rights and constitutional
protection in the United States.
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